We develop a theory of contracts with frames. Frames are used by a contract designer to affect how an agent evaluates various options in the contract. The effect of the frame is not persistent, and the agent can renege on the contract after the effect wears off. We observe that framing does not increase the designer's profit when the agent does not have private information or when framing decreases the agent's willingness to pay. Framing increases profit when it increases willingness to pay in a way that does not distort incentives too much. We characterize the profit-maximizing contract in specific environments, and study applications to price discrimination, insurance, and auctions.
Introduction
This paper begins with two observations. The first is that firms and other economic agents often influence individual behavior via framing. For example, when presenting a menu of membership tiers to potential members, institutions often visually highlight one membership tier in order to influence how different tiers are evaluated.
1 Similarly, by placing big-ticket items near the entrance to every warehouse, Costco may increase consumers' willingness to pay for other items in the warehouse.
The second observation is that the extent to which individual behavior can be influenced via framing is limited. One reason is that individuals are often able to costlessly renege on their purchase decisions once the framing effect has worn off. In some countries, e.g. in Israel, a return policy is mandated by law, while in other countries, e.g. in the United States, such a policy is an important part of firms' business strategies. Another reason is that consumers may learn to anticipate their frame-dependent behavior, and thus avoid the interaction with a seller altogether. Such anticipation may arise, for example, when consumers engage in similar interactions frequently.
The goal of this paper is to study the optimal design of frames and product menus by sellers when consumers either anticipate their frame-dependent behavior or can renege on their purchase decisions.
We study a contracting environment in which a profit-maximizing principal chooses a menu of products to introduce to an agent along with a frame. The frame includes details that cause the agent to behave in a way that may be inconsistent with his preferences. We denote by U a function that summarizes the agent's preferences, or how the agent evaluates outcomes absent any framing, and by U f a function that summarizes how the agent evaluates outcomes in a frame f . Given a product menu Z with a frame f , the agent chooses a U f -maximal product if it is U f -and U -superior to not making a purchase, and otherwise does not purchase anything.
The agent's choice procedure captures the two limitations on framing described above. The first relates to situations in which reneging on the purchase is possible after the framing effect wears off. The procedure then describes an agent who is affected at the point of sale by framing (and thus chooses according to U f ) but reevaluates his purchase decision ex-post according to his preferences and returns the product if he overpaid relative to his outside option. The second relates to situations in which the agent anticipates his frame-dependent behavior. The agent's choice procedure then describes the behavior of an agent who cannot avoid being affected by framing at the point of sale, but anticipates this effect and may therefore choose not to interact with the principal.
We first investigate the impact of the use of frames on the principal's profit. We observe that when the agent does not have private information, an optimal contract with framing does not generate more profit than an optimal frameless contract. This is because the agent's participation decision must be consistent with his preferences. We then show that when the agent has private information, frames that reduce the agent's willingness to pay decrease the principal's profit and will therefore not be used. We also show, by way of an example, that even frames that increase the agent's willingness to pay may decrease the principal's profit. Finally, we observe that frames that increase the agent's willingness to pay in a way that does not incentivize lower types to mimic higher types "too much" increase the principal's profit.
We then characterize the optimal contract with framing in environments in which the agent's private information has two possible values and frames increase the agent's willingness to pay (but not "too much"). In contrast to the standard theory of contracts, we establish that the low-type agent always participates in the contract, that the high type may not participate, and that when the high type participates, he over-consumes relative to the efficient outcome and may not obtain any information rents.
To illustrate our results in a specific setting, we consider an insurance setting a-la Stiglitz (1977) , in which a monopolistic insurance provider offers a menu of insurance policies to a population of risk-averse individuals. Each individual's privately-known risk of having an accident is either low or high. In addition to offering the menu, the provider can also highlight a particular insurance policy, which causes individuals to anticipate regret in case of an accident if they obtain less coverage than in the highlighted policy. We show that the optimal menu of insurance policies differs from the optimal menu in Stiglitz's setting in two ways. First, the menu always includes a policy with partial coverage, which low-risk individuals choose. This is in contrast to Stiglitz's setting, in which low-risk individuals are not insured if their proportion in the population is small. Second, the menu includes either an over-insuring policy that highrisk individuals choose or an over-priced policy that is never chosen. This is again in contrast to Stiglitz's setting, in which high-risk individuals are always fully insured.
The relevance of frames as a design parameter may extend beyond contracting environments.
For example, Delgado's et al. (2008) have shown in an auction setting that frames that highlight the possibility of losing lead to aggressive bidding and higher revenue. We conclude by analyzing a simple example of an efficient auction, in which the designer can affect via framing the degree of bidders' disappointment and thus their bidding behavior. As in our contracting environment, the framing effect is limited, because bidders anticipate their aggressive behavior. This implies that inducing participation in a framed auction is harder than in a frameless one. We observe that despite this fact, the increase in bidders' willingness to pay for the item conditional on participation may be so large that the revenue in an efficient auction with an appropriately chosen frame is larger than in a revenue-maximizing frameless auction.
Our paper is related to the small literature on models of decision making with frames. Salant and Rubinstein (2008) develop a framework of individual choice with frames, and underscore the welfare challenges associated with this framework. Rangel (2007, 2009) independently develop a framework of individual choice with "ancillary conditions," and propose within this framework a model-free approach to welfare analysis. Rubinstein and Salant (2012) propose a model-based approach to welfare analysis that differs from that of Bernheim and Rangel (2009 persuasion with a boundedly-rational agent. Our paper focuses on studying how the ability of the designer to partially influence agents' behavior via framing impacts his profit.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a price discrimination example that illustrates how the predictions of the theory of contracting with frames differ from those of the standard theory. Section 3 introduces the framework. Section 4 discusses how frames that change willingness to pay influence the principal's profit. Section 5 analyzes the optimal contract in environments in which the agent's private information has two possible values. Section 6 studies an application to monopolistic insurance. Section 7 concludes with an application to the theory of auction design.
2 Example: Second-degree price discrimination with fram-
ing
We begin with a simple example of contracting with frames. A risk-neutral profit-maximizing seller wishes to sell a good to a population of consumers, each with unit demand. The quality of the good, x ∈ [0, ρ] for some ρ > 0, is determined by the seller. Producing the good is costless. Each consumer's preferences over bundles (x, t), where t is the price of the good, are summarized by the utility function U (x, t, θ) = xθ − t, where θ ∈ {L, H} with 0 < L < H is the consumer's privately-known valuation. This valuation is Low with probability π L > 0 and High with probability 1 − π L > 0. Absent any framing, a consumer maximizes the function U when choosing among bundles.
In reality, sellers can increase consumers' willingness to pay via framing. For example, by positioning big ticket items such as LCD televisions in the entrance to its warehouses, Costco may increase consumers' willingness to pay for other products in the warehouse. Similarly, restaurants may increase diners' willingness to pay for their food by printing menus on fine paper. We model this by allowing the seller to choose a frame f ∈ F = [0, λ] for some λ > 0, which causes a consumer with valuation θ to behave at the point of sale as if his valuation were θ + f . That is, in the frame f the consumer maximizes the function
The interaction between the seller and the consumers is as follows. The seller chooses a contract to offer the consumers. A contract includes a menu of product qualities and associated prices and a frame f . We refer to the contract in which f = 0 and thus U f = U as the frameless contract. At the point of sale, each consumer chooses a U f -best bundle from the menu if this bundle is U f -superior to not purchasing anything (and obtaining the outside option (0, 0)). Once the effect of the frame has worn off, the consumer reevaluates his purchase decision according to U , and returns the purchased product to the seller for a full refund if it is U -inferior to not purchasing anything. Returns are costless to the seller and the consumer.
We now compare the optimal contracts with and without framing. As we will see, the optimal contract with framing differs from the optimal frameless contract in two respects. First, low-valuation consumers purchase positive quality independently of the distribution of types.
Second, high-valuation consumers may not obtain information rents even though low-valuation consumers purchase positive quality.
Optimal contract without framing
In any frameless contract, if the consumer decides to purchase some bundle, he will not return it. This is because his interim (i.e., at the point of sale) and ex-post (i.e., after making the purchase) participation decisions are made according to the same function U . We can thus ignore the return possibility. Moreover, because the seller can replicate the outcome of any contract in which some type of consumers does not participate by a contract in which this type participates and obtains the outside option (0, 0), the seller's profit maximization program can be written as follows:
The Individual Rationality constraints IR U θ mean that a type θ consumer wishes to participate in the interaction with the seller. The Incentive Compatibility constraints IC U θ mean that conditional on participating, a type θ consumer chooses his intended bundle (x θ , t θ ) over the other type's bundle. It is well-known that the optimal contract has the following properties:
• The high type is indifferent between his bundle and the low type's bundle (IC
• The high type purchases the first-best quality, i.e., x H = ρ.
The seller's problem therefore reduces to choosing x L to maximizes the linear function
Consequently, the profit-maximizing frameless contact is:
• The single-bundle contract (ρ, ρH) that excludes the low type if π L < 1 − L/H, and
• The single-bundle pooling contract (ρ, ρL) otherwise.
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To summarize, in the optimal frameless contract the seller excludes low-valuation consumers if their proportion in the population is small enough, and when this is not the case, high-valuation consumers obtain information rents.
Optimal contract with framing
Consider now the seller's problem with framing. We first solve for the optimal contract with a given frame f > 0, and then optimize over frames.
Fix a frame f > 0. Proposition 2 in Section 5 shows that both types obtain positive qualities
• The high type is U f -indifferent between his bundle and the low type's bundle (IC
• The high type over-consumes relative to the first-best quality. Because quality is bounded above by ρ, which is also the first-best quality, we have that x H = ρ.
A key difference from the optimal frameless contract is that IR U H is not implied by the other constraints.
The seller's problem therefore reduces to choosing
Consequently, the profit-maximizing contract with the frame f is:
• the pooling contract (ρ, ρL) otherwise.
Note the two differences from the optimal frameless contract. First, both types obtain positive qualities independently of the distribution of types. Second, even though the low type obtains a positive quality, the high type may not obtain information rents.
Consider now optimizing over the frame
then the optimal contract with framing is always the pooling contract (ρ, ρL), which is identical to the optimal frameless contract. If π L < 1 − L/(H + λ), then there exists a frame 0 ≤ f < λ such that the optimal contract is the pooling contract (ρ, ρL) for frames f < f , and the above two-bundle separating contract for frames f > f . In this case, the profit in the optimal contract strictly increases in f for f > f , and the maximal profit is obtained in the frame λ.
Framework
We now describe the framework of contracting with frames. Subsection 3.1 describes the contracting environment and the agent's choice procedure. Subsection 3.2 analyzes the fullinformation benchmark. Subsection 3.3 discusses a modified revelation principle that holds in the framework.
Definitions
Environment. The environment is a pair (Y, F ). The set of outcomes Y = X × R ∪ {stayout} includes pairs (x, t), where x ∈ X is a policy and t ∈ R is a transfer from the agent to the principal. The outcome stayout obtains if the agent and principal do not agree on an outcome via the contract. The set F is a set of possible frames. A frame f ∈ F influences the agent to behave in a way that may be inconsistent with his preferences over outcomes, as explained below.
Agent. The agent is characterized by the vector (θ, U, {U f } f ∈F ). The agent's private information is denoted by θ ∈ Θ. The function U : Y × Θ → R reflects the agent's preferences, or how he evaluates different outcomes absent any framing. Each function U f : Y × Θ → R describes how the agent evaluates outcomes in the frame f .
We now describe the agent's choice behavior. A choice problem is a pair (Z, f ), where Z is a subset of outcomes that includes stayout, i.e., stayout ∈ Z ⊂ Y , and f is a frame. For every choice problem (Z, f ), the collection of possible choices of an agent of type θ is the subset (1) all the U f -maximal alternatives in Z that are weakly Usuperior to stayout and (2) stayout if it is weakly U -superior to some U f -maximal alternative in Z.
The choice correspondence C describes the agent's behavior in at least two types of situations.
The first is situations in which reneging on the contract ex-post is possible, either because the principal willingly adopts a return policy or because the law mandates such a policy. In this case, the correspondence C describes an agent who is affected at the point of sale by framing (and thus chooses according to U f ) but reevaluates his purchase according to U after the effect of the frame wears off and returns the product if he overpaid relative to his outside option.
The second type of situations is situations in which the agent anticipates his frame-dependent behavior. Such anticipation may arise because the agent interacts with the principal frequently, because the agent was involved in similar interactions in the past, or because the agent communicates with other agents who are aware of the effect of the frame. In these situations, the correspondence C describes the behavior of an agent who cannot avoid being affected by framing at the point of sale, but anticipates this effect and may therefore choose not to participate in the interaction with the principal.
Principal. The principal has a prior distribution over Θ, and knows the functions U and {U f } f ∈F and the correspondence C. The principal is profit maximizing and his cost of providing the policy x to a type θ agent is c(x, θ). We assume that c(stayout, θ) = 0 for every θ ∈ Θ.
Contract. A contract is a triple (A, M, f ), where A is the set of actions available to the agent if he decides to participate, M : A → Y is a mapping from actions to outcomes, and Implementation. An allocation rule g assigns to each θ ∈ Θ an outcome
"Null" frame. We assume that the principal can always offer a frameless contract to the agent. To capture this formally, we let φ ∈ F denote the "null" frame, and assume that φ ∈ F (A, M ) for every (A, M ). In the null frame, the agent evaluates outcomes according to U , i.e., U φ = U , and chooses a U -maximal outcome from every choice problem Z for which stayout ∈ Z ⊂ Y . We refer to (A, M, φ) as a frameless contract.
Full-information benchmark
As a benchmark, we consider the case in which the principal observes the agent's private information. The following observation states that framing does not increase the principal's profit in this case.
Observation 1 For every contract there exists a frameless contract that generates a weakly higher profit.
To prove the observation, it suffices to show that if the agent chooses some outcome in a contract with framing, he will also choose the same outcome in some frameless contract. Fix a type θ and a contract (A, M, f ), and let (
. By the definition of C, the outcome (x, t) is weakly U f -superior and U -superior to stayout. This implies that the agent will also choose (x, t) in the frameless contract in which (x, t) is the only available outcome, because (x, t) is weakly U -superior to stayout.
While Observation 1 is mathematically trivial, it suggests that a seller cannot benefit from framing and other behavioral manipulations in full-information environments in which consumers can renege costlessly on their decisions or in which consumers anticipate their biases. The observation also suggests that if a seller benefits from framing in a full-information environment, then non-manipulated consumers would prefer not to interact with him.
Modified revelation principle
When the agent has private information in our framework, the revelation principle may not hold. This is because the set of frames that can be chosen in a direct revelation contract may not include all possible frames.
To discuss a modified version of the revelation principle, we first modify the notion of a direct revelation contract.
Direct Revelation Contract (DRC).
A Direct Revelation Contract (DRC) for an alloca-
The mapping M g need not coincide with g when g(θ) = stayout. This is because -in contrast to the standard model -it is not without loss of generality in our framework to assume that all types participate in the contract. 3 Indeed, if a type θ agent does not participate in the contract because the contract includes a U f -maximal outcome that is strictly U -inferior to stayout, it may be impossible to replicate the contract with another contract in which stayout is a possible outcome and in which the agent participates and chooses stayout. This is because stayout may be strictly U f -inferior to other outcomes in the contract. The following example illustrates this.
Example 1 Consider a two-type setting, with Θ = {L, H} and F = {f, φ}. Let L and H also denote two outcomes in Y . Suppose that both types' preferences over outcomes satisfy L stayout H. Suppose also that the frame f does not affect the low type but makes the outcome H more appealing to the high type. That is, in the frame f the high type evaluates outcomes in a way that is consistent with the ranking H L stayout.
Suppose that the principal wishes to implement the allocation rule g(H) = stayout and g(L) = L. While it is possible to implement g with the contract (Θ,
it is impossible to implement g with any contract (Θ, g, ·).♦
To state the next observation, we require the following definition. The triple (Θ,
Observation 2 The set of implementable allocation rules is bounded below by the set of allocation rules implementable by DRCs, and bounded above by the set of allocation rules implementable by DRCs and infeasible DRCs.
The first part is trivial. The second part follows from the same reasoning that underlies the standard revelation principle. Note, however, that if some contract (A, M, f ) implements g and g (θ) = stayout, then it may be that M (a(θ)) = stayout, where a(θ) denotes the action chosen by a type θ agent. In the associated (perhaps infeasible) DRC we would then have
The following example illustrates cases in which the set of implementable allocation rules differs from the bounds specified in Observation 2.
Example 2 Consider a two-type setting, with Θ = {L, I} and F = {f, φ}. Let L, I, and H denote three outcomes in Y . Suppose that both types' preferences over outcomes satisfy L I H stayout. Suppose also that the frame f highlights the outcome H. This affects the behavior of type I (but not L) as described below. In particular, for f to be part of a contract the agent must be able to choose H in the contract. Suppose that the principal wishes to implement the allocation rule g(θ) = θ.
To see that the set of implementable allocation rules is strictly larger than the set of allocation rules implementable by DRCs, suppose that in the frame f type I evaluates outcomes in a way that is consistent with the ranking I L H stayout. Then, a contract with the frame f in which the image of the contract's mapping is {L, I, H} implements g. However, since only an infeasible DRC for g can include f , g is not implementable by a DRC.
To see that the set of implementable allocation rules is strictly smaller than the set of allocation rules implementable by DRCs and infeasible DRCs, suppose that in the frame f type I evaluates outcomes in a way that is consistent with the ranking H I L stayout. Then, g is implementable by the infeasible DRC (Θ, g, f ), but is not implementable by any contract. This is because g is not implementable by a frameless contract; and for f to be part of a contract the agent must be able to choose H in the contract. But then type I will choose H instead of I.♦ 4 Analysis: Frames that change willingness to pay
Observation 1 shows that a necessary condition for framing to increase the principal's profit is that the agent has private information. In this case, framing can reduce the agent's information rents by affecting different types' behavior differently. One channel for affecting the agent's behavior is changing the agent's willingness to pay. We say that a frame f reduces the agent's willingness to pay if for any pair of outcomes (x, t) > (x , t ) and any type θ, U (x, t, θ) ≤
That is, the amount that the agent is willing to pay for x−x additional units of the policy under the frame is smaller than without the frame.
A frame f increases the agent's willingness to pay if for any pair of outcomes (x, t) > (x , t ) and
. For example, in the price discrimination example in Section 2, framing increases the agent's willingness to pay. Of course, there are natural manipulations that do not increase (or decrease) the agent's willingness to pay. For example, highlighting a specific bundle in the contract may affect willingness to pay differently depending on whether the bundles are smaller or larger than the highlighted bundle.
We analyze such an example in Section 6.
To discuss how changing the agent's willingness to pay in the frame affects profit, we begin by making several assumptions. We then show that if frames reduce the agent's willingness to pay, every profit-maximizing contract is frameless. We also show that while frames that slightly increase the agent's willingness to pay increase the principal's profit, those that increase willingness to pay substantially may in fact decrease the principal's profit.
Assumptions
Let Θ = {θ 1 , . . . , θ N } be an ordered set of N types, with θ i < θ j for i < j. Let F be a set of frames that includes the null frame φ. Let X = [0, d] for some d > 0, and let stayout = (0, 0), i.e., we identify the agent's outside option with the lowest policy and a transfer of 0. Fix a cardinal representation {U f } f ∈F , and assume that every U f is strictly increasing in x, strictly decreasing in t, and continuous in x and t. Assume that the principal's cost c is increasing and continuous in x, and satisfies c (0, θ) = 0. We denote by (x * θ , t * θ ) the bundle that solves the principal's full-information profit maximization program subject to the agent of type θ obtaining a utility of U (stayout, θ), and we assume that the associated profit is strictly positive.
We now present two assumptions on frames. The first assumption states that all frames are available in any DRC, so it suffices to analyze DRCs.
As Example 2 shows, (A1) may fail when a frame highlights a particular bundle.
The second assumption postulates a standard single crossing property. In the context of contracting with frames, it states that the effect of framing is limited in the sense that frames cannot "reverse" the relative willingness to pay across types.
Assumption A2. For any frame f ∈ F , any two outcomes (x, t) > (x , t ), and any two
Frames that reduce willingness to pay
Consider a frame f that reduces the agent's willingness to pay. The frame has two effects on the agent's behavior. First, if the agent U f -prefers some bundle to staying out (and obtaining (0, 0)), then the agent also U -prefers this bundle to staying out. This implies that the agent is less willing to participate in a contract with the frame f than in a frameless contract with the same menu. Second, conditional on participating, each type's incentives to mimic lower types are larger in the contract with the frame f than in a frameless contract with the same menu.
These two effects imply that:
Proposition 1 If every frame reduces willingness to pay, then every optimal contract is frameless.
Proof. Consider an allocation rule g and a DRC (Θ, M g , f ) that implements g. Without loss of generality, we can assume that M g (θ) = g (θ) for every type θ. 4 In addition, letting g (θ) = y θ = (x θ , t θ ) be type θ's bundle, we have that x θ ≥ x θ and t θ ≥ t θ for θ > θ . 5 We will now show that there exists a frameless contract that achieves a strictly higher profit.
Indeed, if type θ strictly U f -preferred some bundle in the menu to stayout, then he would also strictly U -prefer it, by decreased willingness to pay, so the DRC would not implement g. 5 If both types participate, this follows from (A2). If θ does not participate, then g (θ ) = stayout, otherwise type θ would U f -prefer g (θ ) to stayout, and by reduced willingness to pay would also U -prefer it, and so would participate.
If
generates a strictly higher profit.
Otherwise, y θ N = stayout. Replace the frame f by the null frame φ, leaving the rest of the DRC unchanged. Reduced willingness to pay implies that every type θ for which g (θ) = y θ N strictly U -prefers y θ N to stayout and to all other bundles in the menu. Therefore, if the frameless contract still implements g, the profit can be increased by slightly increasing t θ N .
If the contract does not implement g, then reduced willingness to pay implies that this is only because some types strictly U -prefer the bundles of some higher types. Denote by θ i the lowest type that strictly U -prefers the bundle of some higher type to his own bundle y θ i . Denote by θ j the lowest type whose bundle type θ i strictly U -prefers to y θ i . By (A2) and the minimality of j, every type θ k , i < k < j, strictly U -prefers y θ j to y θ k . 6 Modify y θ j by increasing t θ j until type θ i is U -indifferent between the resulting bundle and y θ i , and denote the modified bundle by y θ j . Note that type θ j U -prefers y θ j to stayout and to y θ 1 , . . . , y θ j−1 . 7 Therefore, if some type θ strictly U -prefers the bundle of another type θ to his own bundle, then θ > θ, and the modification process can be repeated. Since i or j increase in every iteration of the process, proceeding in this way we end up with a contract in which every type U -prefers his bundle to the other types' bundles and which generates a higher profit than the original framed DRC.
Frames that increase willingness to pay
Proposition 1 shows that frames that reduce willingness to pay will not be used by the principal.
We now turn to frames that increase willingness to pay.
Assumption A3. For any frame f ∈ F \ {φ}, any pair of outcomes (x, t) > (x , t ), and any
To discuss how increased willingness to pay affects the principal's profit, fix an optimal frameless DRC, denote by y θ i = (x θ i , t θ i ) the bundle aimed at type θ i , and assume that the DRC is not fully pooling.
Adding a frame f to this DRC has three effects on the agent's behavior. 8 First, if the agent U -prefers some bundle to staying out, then he also U f -prefers this bundle to staying out. This implies that framing does not change the agent's participation decision relative to the frameless DRC. Second, the incentives of type θ i to choose bundles aimed at lower types are reduced.
Third, the incentives of type θ i to choose bundles aimed at higher types are increased.
6 Type θ i strictly U -prefers y θj to y θi , and weakly U -prefers y θi to y θ k (by the definition of j). Thus, type θ i strictly U -prefers y θj to y θ k . By (A2), type θ k also strictly U -prefers y θj to y θ k .
7 Type θ i is U -indifferent between y θj and y θi , and U -prefers y θi to y θi+1 , . . . , y θj−1 (by the definition of j) and to stayout and y θ1 , . . . , y θi−1 (by reduced willingness to pay). Thus, type θ i U -prefers y θj to stayout, y θ1 , . . . , y θj−1 .
By (A2), type θ j also U -prefers y θj to stayout and y θ1 , . . . , y θj−1 .
8 By A1, f is available with the given menu.
The
In this case, the principal's profit in an optimal contract with the frame f is strictly higher than in the above frameless DRC. This is because in the frameless DRC each type θ i is U -indifferent between y θ i and y θ i−1 , so the second effect implies that the principal can increase t θ N slightly without affecting the behavior of any of the types.
On the other hand, when some types strictly U f -prefer the bundles of some higher types, increased willingness to pay may not lead to higher profit, and may even lead to strictly lower profit. To see this, consider a two-type setting in which the low type's U -willingness to pay is much lower than that of the high type, and in which framing increases the willingness to pay of the low type so much that his behavior in the frame becomes very similar to that of the high type. Then, in the frame, the principal has to provide similar policies to both types, which may decrease the principal's profit despite the positive effect of increasing the willingness to pay. The following example illustrates this.
Example 3 Consider the price discrimination example in Section 2 with the following modifications. First, there is a positive production cost that is independent of the buyer's type. The marginal production cost is M C(x) = x for x ≤ 1 and M C(x) = 1 + (x − 1) /B for x > 1, where B is large. 9 Second, we fix L = 1, H = 2, and π L > 1/2. Third, F = {φ, f }, where f = 9. That is, the seller can only increase the buyer's willingness to pay substantially.
We will now specify two frameless contracts, D and E, and show that the profit in any contract with the frame f is strictly lower than the maximum of the profit that D generates and
, and t H = 2B + 1. In the contract D the low type chooses the bundle (x * L , t * L ) and the high type chooses the bundle (x * H , t H ). The contract generates a profit of π H (B + 1) /2 from selling to the high type, which is only π H less than the first-best profit from selling to the high type, and generates the first-best profit from selling to the low type. Let E = {(ε, ε) , (x * H , t * H − ε)} for some small ε > 0. In the contract E the low type chooses the bundle (ε, ε) and the high type chooses the bundle (x * H , t * H − ε). Because π L > π H , if ε is sufficiently small, then E generates a profit that is strictly higher than the first-best profit from selling to the high type.
Consider a contract with the frame f that excludes one of the types. If it excludes the high type, then the profit it generates is bounded above by the first-best profit from selling to the low type, which is strictly lower than the profit generated by D. If it excludes the low type, then the profit it generates is bounded above by the first-best profit from selling to the high type, which is strictly lower than the profit generated by E.
Now consider a non-excluding contract
, (x H , t H )} with the frame f , in which type θ chooses the bundle (x θ , t θ ), and which generates more profit than an excluding contract. 9 The cost of producing x units is therefore c(x) = x 2 /2 for x ≤ 1 and c(x) = 1 − B + 2 (B − 1) x + x 2 /2B for x > 1.
To generate more profit than D does, D must generate a profit of at least π H (B + 1) /2 from selling to the high type, because D already generates the first-best profit from selling to the low type. This implies that x H > B/4, because the high type's marginal willingness to pay under U is 2. Because the low type has to choose (x L , t L ) over (x H , t H ), we must also have that The following observation summarizes our discussion of frames that increase the agent's willingness to pay.
Observation 3 Suppose that the optimal frameless DRC is not fully pooling. If there exists a frame f such that every type U f -prefers his bundle in this DRC to higher types' bundles, then every optimal contract involves framing. If there does not exist such a frame, then it may be that every optimal contract is frameless.
Analysis: Optimal framing with two types
Observation 3 shows that an optimal contract with a frame that increases willingness to pay may generate less profit than an optimal frameless contract. This happens when the frame strengthens lower types' incentives to mimic higher types to such a degree that it overcomes the profit-increasing effect of weakening the higher types' incentives to mimic lower types. In this section, we introduce Assumption (A4) on frames in two-type environments, which guarantees that this does not happen by limiting the distortion that frames introduce. We then characterize the optimal contract under Assumptions (A1)-(A4).
Consider the setting of Section 4 with N = 2, so Θ = {L, H} with L < H. Denote by π θ > 0 the probability of type θ ∈ Θ. In addition to the assumptions in Subsection 4.1, assume that every U f is differentiable in x and t and that the principal's cost c is independent of the agent's type. Assume also that the principal's complete-information profit maximization program subject to the agent of type θ obtaining a given level of U -utility greater or equal to U (stayout, θ) is strictly concave in the policy for each type and has a unique solution, in which the policy is x * θ ∈ (0, d].
10
10 In particular, x * θ is independent of the utility level of the agent. This is always the case if the agent's utility is quasi-linear in t, and is also the case in the insurance setting of Section 6.
We also strengthen assumptions (A2) and (A3) slightly as follows. First, we assume that for the function U the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of x to t at (0, 0) exists and is strictly higher for the high type than for the low type. 11 This assumption implies that the low type is excluded from an optimal frameless contract if his probability is low enough. 12 Second, we assume that for t ≤ t * H the MRS of U f (x, t, H) at (x * H , t) is strictly higher than the MRS of U (x, t, H) at (x * H , t). This assumption is used only in the proof of the second half of part (4) of Proposition 3 below.
The new non-technical assumption on frames, Assumption (A4), states that the distortion created by framing is limited in the sense that in the first-best solution to the principal's profit maximization problem the high type agent wants to mimic the low type agent, just like in the standard model.
H , H). The next subsection characterizes the optimal contract under Assumptions (A1)-(A4). Proposition 2 shows that the low type's policy is strictly positive for any distribution of types. This is in contrast to the standard model in which -under the assumption that the MRS of the high type is strictly larger than the MRS of the low type at (0, 0) -the low type's policy is 0 if his probability is low enough. Observation 4 shows that if every optimal contract is separating, then every optimal contract involves framing. Proposition 3 shows that in this case the high type's policy is higher than the efficient policy. In contrast, in the standard model the high type obtains the efficient policy in the optimal contract. Proposition 4 characterizes the optimal frame.
Analysis
Assumption (A1) implies that it suffices to analyze allocations implementable by DRCs. We
and the shorthand {(x L , t L ), (x H , t H )} when there is no ambiguity regarding the frame. If the contract is a pooling contract or excludes some type, we use the shorthand {(x, t)} to describe the contract.
By assumption (A2), x H ≥ x L and t H ≥ t L in any DRC. Moreover, the single-crossing property of U and the properties of the principal's cost function and profit maximization program
11 That is,
12 Without this assumption, the low type is "essentially excluded" in the sense that as π L converges to 0, so does the policy of the low type.
Participation
Recall that in the standard model without framing, the optimal contract excludes the low type agent if his probability π L > 0 is low enough. In this case, the principal offers the one-bundle contract {(x * H , t * H )}. The high type agent chooses this bundle and the low type stays out. 13 In the model of contracts with frames, this is no longer true. Under (A1)-(A4), the low type agent is never excluded in an optimal contract.
14 Proposition 2 A profit-maximizing contract involves a positive policy for both types regardless of the distribution of types.
Proof. Because the cost is type-independent, a contract that excludes the high type is strictly dominated by the pooling contract {(x * L , t * L )}. And because the profit in any contract that the excludes the low type is bounded above by π H (t * Fix a frame f = φ. Let (x L , t L ) denote the bundle that satisfies that (1) the high type is
, and (2) the low type is U -indifferent between staying out and ( 
By construction, when presented with the choice problem ({(x L , t L ), (x changes in the transfers will make these choices unique.
The profit from the DRC {(x L , t L ), (x * H , t * H ), f } is higher than selling only (x * H , t * H ) to the high type, because x L < x * L implies that the profit from selling to the low type is positive by our assumption on the profit function.
Finally, note that (x L , t L ) is independent of the distribution of types. This implies that in a profit-maximizing contract the policy for the low type (and therefore for the high type) is bounded away from 0 independently of the type distribution. This is because as the low-type's policy approaches 0, the principal's profit from the low type's bundle approaches 0, which is smaller than his profit from the bundle (x L , t L ), whereas his profit from the high-type's bundle cannot be higher than his profit from (x * H , t * H ), so the profit from the DRC {(x L , t L ), (x * H , t * H ), f } is higher than the profit from any contract in which the low type's policy is sufficiently small.
Principal's program
Proposition 2 implies that in the optimal contract both types' policies are bounded away from 0 independently of the distribution of types. Thus, an optimal DRC has to satisfy the following two participation constraints:
By (A3), IR
U θ implies IR f θ , so we can ignore IR f θ . In addition, the optimal contract has to satisfy the Incentive Compatibility constraint for each type. The principal's program can therefore be written as:
for θ, θ ∈ {L, H} and θ = θ.
Pooling versus separating contracts
If some optimal contract is a pooling contract, then the optimal pooling contracts consist of the single bundle (x * L , t * L ) with some frame f ∈ F . This is because in this case IR U L has to hold with equality (otherwise the transfer can be increased) and because IC f θ is trivially satisfied in a pooling contract. Otherwise, Observation 4 If every optimal contract is separating, then every optimal contract involves framing.
One sufficient condition for every optimal contract to be separating is that x * L < x * H . Another sufficient condition is that x * H is an interior policy and the MRS of
15
To verify Observation 4, suppose to the contrary that there exists an optimal separating DRC that is frameless, and denote it by 
The modified contract with frame f then satisfies all the constraints and generates a strictly higher profit than the initial frameless contract, a contradiction.
Properties of optimal separating contracts
The following result describes four properties of a profit-maximizing separating DRC. The first three properties are similar to properties of the optimal separating contract in the standard theory. The fourth property is qualitatively different because it implies that the optimal contract involves "over-consumption" by the high type.
16

{(x
L implies that the principal's marginal profit at x L along the low type's U -indifference curve is positive, while x H = x * H implies that the principal's marginal profit at x H along the high type's U -indifference curve is 0. Therefore, the profit can be increased by increasing x H slightly along the high type's U -indifference curve, which relaxes IC f H and makes it possible to increase x L along the low type's U -indifference curve. 
Properties of an optimal frame
We now characterize the optimal frame. The following two partial orderings of F rank frames according to the high type's willingness to pay in the frame. For two frames f and k, we say that
Proposition 4 If f k, then the profit in an optimal contract with f is weakly higher than in an optimal contract with k. If f k and some optimal contract with k is separating, then the profit in an optimal contract with f is strictly higher than in k.
In particular, if every optimal contract is separating and the relation has a maximal element f , then the frame f is the unique optimal frame.
L is equal to the low type's U -MRS, whereas x * L < x * H implies that the high type's U -MRS at x * L is strictly higher (because the profit function is concave along each type's U -indifference curve). Therefore, by (A3), decreasing x L by some small ε along the low type's U -indifference curve decreases the high type's U f -utility from the bundle (x L , t L ) by at least δε for some δ > 0 that is independent of ε. On the other hand, the high type's U f -marginal utility with respect to t at (x H , t H ) is finite, so decreasing his U f -utility by δε without changing x H requires increasing t H by at least γδε for some γ > 0 that is independent of εδ. Thus, for sufficiently small ε this leads to an increase in the principal's profit, because to a first order the change in profit from changing the the low type's bundle is 0, and this change allows an increase in profit from the high type that is at least γ to a first order.
20 More precisely, increasing x H by some small ε along the high type's U -indifference curve increases the high type's U f -utility from the bundle (x H , t H ) by at least δε for some δ > 0 that is independent of ε. And increasing
x L by some small γ along the low type's U -indifference curve increases the high type's U f -utility from the bundle (x L , t L ) by no more than αγ for some α > 0. Thus, the increase of x H by ε allows to increase x L by at least δε/α. And because the marginal effect on the profit of such an increase in x H is 0, whereas the marginal effect on the profit of the increase in x L is positive, for small ε the profit increases.
Proof. Suppose that f k, and consider a profit-maximizing contract
(Proposition 2 shows that no type is excluded). If the contract is a pooling one, then the same bundle with the frame f will generate the same profit. Suppose that the contract is separating, 
H )}, which contradicts (A4) for the frame k). In this case, increase (x L , t L ) slightly along the low type's U -indifference curve, which increases the profit.
is violated, which implies by (A2) that IC f H holds strictly. By Proposition 3, we have that binds we have a contract that satisfies all the constraints with a higher profit than the original one.
Discussion
In two-type environments, the model of contracting with frames has several predictions that differ qualitatively from the standard model. The first relates to the participation of the low type. Proposition 2 shows that it is optimal for the principal to contract with the low type independently of the low type's probability. This is in contrast to the standard model, in which if the low type's probability is low enough it is optimal for the principal to exclude the low type in order to eliminate the high type's information rents.
The second prediction relates to the participation of the high type. While proposition 2 shows that when the principal's cost is type-independent it is always optimal to contract with the high type, this is no longer true when the cost is type-dependent. In such cases, the cost of contracting with the high type may be so high that the principal may wish to exclude him. This is impossible in the standard model with the single-crossing property, because if the low type participates then the high type prefers the low type's contract to staying out. But excluding the high type may be possible in the model with frames. To exclude the high type, the principal has to offer him a bundle that he evaluates as U f -superior to the low type's bundle and to staying out, but as U -inferior to staying out. Section 6 illustrates a setting in which this occurs.
A third departure from the standard model relates to cases in which both types participate and the optimal contract is a separating one. Proposition 3 shows that in such cases the high type's policy will be inefficient, as long as this is technologically feasible. In particular, an optimal contract involves over-consumption by the high type. This is in contrast to the standard model in which the high type's policy is always efficient. 
The insurance provider offers a menu of insurance bundles to the individual, and decides how to present this menu. In presenting the menu, the provider can highlight one of the bundles in the menu, while priming the individual to think about the possibility of having an accident.
We denote a particular highlighted bundle by f = (x f , t f ) (if no bundle is highlighted, then f = (0, 0)). A contract is a menu of bundles and a highlighted bundle that belongs to the menu (or the bundle (0, 0)). The set F of all possible frames is therefore the set of all possible bundles.
In the frame f , the individual treats the highlighted bundle as a reference point. He anticipates that if he purchases an insurance bundle (x, t), he will experience regret in the form of r (max {x f − x, 0}) utils if the accident occurs, in addition to any effect the accident has on his wealth level. That is, in the frame f the individual chooses from the menu a bundle (x, t) that maximizes
We assume that the regret function r is continuously differentiable and satisfies the following properties:
• r (∆) > 0 for ∆ ≥ 0: Regret is increasing in the difference in coverage ∆ = x f − x between the reference coverage and the chosen coverage as long as the reference coverage is the higher one.
• r (∆) < 0 for ∆ > 0: The marginal sensitivity to regret is decreasing,
• r(0) = 0 : There is no regret if the chosen coverage is higher than the reference coverage.
21
Before discussing properties of the optimal insurance contract, we examine how the model's assumptions relate to those of the previous section. Assumption (A1) does not hold because the reference bundle must be included in the contract. Nevertheless, we can proceed as if (A1) holds, because given any DRC and any coverage x that is not part of a bundle in the DRC, a bundle (x, t) can be added to the DRC with t being so high that no type would choose (x, t).
Assumption (A2) holds: a high-risk individual is willing to pay more than a low-risk individual to buy an additional unit of insurance, regardless of the reference bundle. This is because a high-risk individual is more likely to have an accident. Assumption (A3) does not hold, but Proposition 2 and most of Proposition 3 (except for the strict upward distortion in part (4)) rely only on a weaker property that does hold in the current model. This weaker property is that for any (x, t) > (x , t ) and every frame f = φ,
L . There are two additional differences from the previous section. First, the principal's cost depends on the individual's type. The only change this introduces to the analysis is that it may be optimal to exclude the high-risk individual. This can in fact happen, as we will show below.
Second, the proof of strict upward distortion in part (4) of Proposition 3 does not directly apply, because (A3) fails and not every frame f = φ satisfies the MRS assumption used in the proof.
But since every reference bundle with x f > A does satisfy the MRS assumption, we will show directly that the optimal contract strictly over-insures the high-risk individual.
We now characterize the optimal contract. The first property is similar to Stiglitz's (1977) model.
Property 1
In an optimal contract, high-risk and low-risk individuals never purchase the same insurance bundle.
To see why, suppose to the contrary that there is an optimal pooling contract (x, t). Then 0 < x ≤ A. Indeed, x > 0 because an optimal contract must generate positive profit. And 21 Note that r does not depend on the premium in the reference bundle. Our characterization of the optimal contract extends to cases in which r decreases in the reference premium, as long as r's dependency on the premium satisfies conditions that parallel those in the first two bullet points. selling x > A units to both types at the low type's willingness to pay leads to a lower profit than selling A units to both types at the low type's willingness to pay. If x = A, then decrease x by a small ε > 0 and decrease t by slightly more than εL so 
Conclusion: Framing in auctions
This paper incorporates framing into contract theory. By using frames, a contract designer affects how an agent evaluates various options in the contract, and the agent either anticipates this effect ex-ante or can renege on his choice ex-post.
We observed that framing does not increase the designer's profit when the agent does not have private information or when framing decreases the agent's willingness to pay. We also showed that framing increases the designer's profit when it leads to increased willingness to pay but does not distort the agent's incentives too much. When the agent's private information has only two possible values, we established that -in contrast to the standard theory of contracts -the low-type agent always participates in the contract, the high type may not participate, and when the high type does participate, he over-consumes and may not obtain information rents. We conclude with an example that illustrates the potential relevance of frames as a design parameter in multi-agent environments and, in particular, in auctions.
In an auction, bidders' behavior may be influenced by various features of the auction environment. One example is Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay's (2007) experimental auction, in which announcing that the winning bid will be revealed causes subjects to bid more aggressively. Another example is Delgado's et al. (2008) experimental auction, in which subjects bid more aggressively in an auction with a frame that highlights the possibility of losing than in a baseline frameless auction. It may be the case that auction designers can achieve similar effects in real-world auctions by having the auctioneer give a vivid pitch that describes the item for sale, placing bidders close to one another in a small room, or having the bidders call out prices. Such framing of the auction environment may not only influence bidders to anticipate disappointment if they lose, but may also affect the degree of disappointment. We now consider a reduced-form example of a single-unit auction in an environment in which the auction designer can do this.
Let θ ∼ IID U [0, 1] denote a bidder's private value for the item, and let U (x, t, θ) = xθ − t, where x is the probability of winning the item, describe the preferences over outcomes of a type θ bidder. Let F denote all the possible ways in which the auction designer can affect bidders' anticipated disappointment. In a frame f ∈ F , with f : [0, 1] → R + , a bidder of type θ evaluates outcomes according to the function U f (x, t, θ) = xθ − (1 − x)f (θ) − t. We would like the frame to affect the bidder only if he decides to compete with other bidders in the auction, so we assume that U f (stayout, θ) = 0 = U (stayout, θ). Given U and {U f }, the behavior of a type θ bidder is summarized by the correspondence C θ (Z, f ). We also assume that the designer maximizes his profit subject to efficiency, i.e., he has to allocate the item to the bidder with the highest type.
Note that we allow the effect of a frame to vary with the bidder's type. When this is not the case, the revenue equivalence theorem implies that the revenue in an efficient auction with this frame is identical to the revenue in an efficient frameless auction. In addition, unlike in the earlier analysis, we do not identify stayout with the outcome (0, 0). This allows us to capture the idea that the bidder is affected by the frame only when he decides to actually submit a bid and thereby to compete with the other bidders in the auction. This is different from contracting environments, in which the competitive aspect does not exist. Moreover, because the auction designer has to implement an efficient allocation, he is restricted to choosing f such that IR The last point implies that inducing participation in a framed efficient auction is harder than in a frameless one. But conditional on participating, bidders' willingness to pay for the item is higher in the framed auction. The following observation shows that the reduction in information rents that results from the increased willingness to pay (conditional on participation) may be much larger than the possible decrease in revenue due to the more demanding participation constraint.
Observation 5 Suppose that there exists an auction with a frame f that implements an efficient allocation such that for every type θ, f (θ) is strictly larger than the expected surplus of type θ in a frameless efficient auction. Then, the revenue in the auction with the frame f is strictly larger than the revenue in a revenue-maximizing (inefficient) frameless auction.
To prove Observation 5, it suffices to show that the revenue in an efficient auction with the frame f that assigns to every type θ an anticipated disappointment that equals his expected surplus in an efficient frameless auction is larger than in the optimal frameless auction.
Let N denote the number of bidders in the auction. By Myerson (1981) , one optimal frameless auction is a second-price auction with a reserve price of 1/2. The revenue in this auction is: .
By the revenue equivalence theorem, the revenue in an efficient auction with the frame f is identical to the revenue in a second price auction with the frame f . In a second price auction with the frame f , a type θ bidder has a dominant strategy of bidding θ + f (θ). Therefore, the 
